August 19, 2008
公民與社會？
明年大學指定科目考試要加考公民與社會這一科。沒什麼特別意見，因為就內容而言其實指涉的東西在大學應該是屬於社會科學概論這樣的事情。不過如果是這樣，那位什麼不乾脆就叫社會科學概論？硬要給一個公民，聽起來太有規範的意味在。 還有像是宣示歸化國籍的考試才會用到的「公民」。
不要跟我說是公民訓育喔，這時在很倒彈。
Posted by tacchang at 02:54 AM | Comments (0)
July 18, 2008
我終於搞清楚那個廢校問題了
上次我用了很不成熟的口吻譏笑了一堆大人對於那個廢校併校的新聞，現在我終於搞清楚怎麼回事了。
前情提要
總爺國小，這麼名字很炫吧，總爺是麻豆的一個地名，那邊是以出產糖聞名。也就是台糖總爺糖廠！不過製糖這件以前台灣的維生命脈，在不敵進口糖的壓力之下，早就已經沒了，所以，糖廠已廢，當然，服務糖廠員工子弟的總爺國小就有辦學的問題。
在之前不知道是怎麼想的，台南縣政府是以擴大學區的方式讓總爺國小對全麻豆招生，很多家長看到有一個被糖廠那優美的環境包圍的國小，就有了幻想，以為是森林小學，好吧，美麗的誤會！只是誤會總要被澄清的一天，這個學校校地太小了，旁邊有一個文正國小，很大！學生通通轉過去都還有剩，加上台南縣政府是很窮的，所以就希望兩邊併校！
結果就被告官了。然後馬總統直接對教育部命令【文下留校】，也就是讓總爺繼續招生。不過這是違憲的，因為辦國小是屬於地方事務，地方有權怎麼好辦怎麼辦。但是在一堆奇怪的勢力運作之下，居然搞很大。以為這些學生的受教權被犧牲了。
恐怖的web2.0勢力
在現在這個不相信大眾媒體的時代，個人的確擁有力量。有個Blogger就很好奇，到底這兩個學校地理環境如何？對啊，我們都不在麻豆，哪知道這是什麼東西？是隔座山呢，還是隔條河？不查沒事，一查才曉得原來是這樣的。
大家到底在吵什麼啊？根本上已經不是學區與受教權的問題，是那種我念總爺比較厲害的心裡因素作祟吧？令人厭惡的心態！況且，兩個學校辦學績效有差這麼多嗎？都是國小，又沒基測什麼的，念的國中也一樣，吵什麼咧？
所以我那一篇也是對的，都是大人惹得禍！
Posted by tacchang at 07:51 PM | Comments (0)
July 03, 2008
交大前校長張博士佳言錄
「不幫你們請老師有什麼關係?你們沒指導教授畢不了業有什麼關係?交大是個好學校,你們就多唸個三五年,碩士念到三十歲也可以啊~」by張校長,2000年
這是學弟妹因為所上老師嚴重不足跑去找校長，結果偉大的校長說了這麼一段話。當然，那個時候大家都年紀小，又嫩，根本沒想到要錄音，以為校長是包大人，會主持公道，結果，唉。
烏盆啊烏盆～～～～～～～～害我想唱起京劇來
Posted by tacchang at 09:39 PM | Comments (0)
May 19, 2008
好詩
黑髮不知勤學早,回首已是白頭翁,
枯木逢春猶再發,人無兩度再少年。
同樣是要珍惜時光用功，意境差好多。一個唯美，一個恐怖。這大概也跟以前看的保護雨林廣告一樣。恐怖訴求讓你會怕，會怕就會做（？）哈。
趕快畢業才是真的，老爸已經跟我要我的畢業方帽囉。
Posted by tacchang at 09:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 11, 2008
很想罵髒話，但是不可以
事情是這樣子的（又要咬我耳朵啊，不要啊大少爺！）
好吧，私校本身有自治權，外界不好干涉，不過，這樣的舉動跟以前的髮禁有什麼不同？？
我不喜歡這個團體有時候會跟別人講我們是個講慈悲道德的團體，所以我們不會做壞事。恩，我保留不會做壞事的部分。因為我認為這只是個假設。假設宗教都是與人為善，正大光明。不過為什麼一定要在內湖的保護區弄一個很大的建築，然後說這會保護水土？這種說法跟在水庫集水區說我們開墾，是把一些雜樹雜草清除掉，讓環境更美麗；跟高爾夫球場說，我們開墾這片山坡地，讓環境更美，心曠神怡。不覺得是一樣的事情？
話說回來大學生穿制服這件事情。當然可以要求學生的衣著打扮！我強烈支持！！私校嘛，今天要女的光頭，男的全留長髮；或者男生穿蘇格蘭裙，女生穿周女士愛穿的牛仔褲。這些都是自治權的管理範圍。只是，招生簡章裡面有沒有講清楚，我們一律穿制服，吃素？讓在跳進去這樣的學校之前可以讓人搞清楚這是個什麼樣的學校是很重要的。
再講另外一件事情，很多學校或者學系把名字改得很風風光光，如果換湯不換藥，這可以不可以告到公平會檢舉為誇大不實廣告？
辦教育要辦成功，不是靠這些外在的東西，以前清大校長說了一句很有風骨但是可能想享有點矯情，但是的確說到重點的，我們不要大樓，我們要大師。外表呈現的東西如果金光霹靂閃亮亮，但是完全不能接受檢驗，那是很糟的。
Posted by tacchang at 01:41 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
January 02, 2008
讀格心得
昨天看完投名狀，發現原來桃園三結義也可以有個清朝版。今天看到一個格說了一句真是雋永千古的名言：
色戒： 女人不可靠；投名狀：兄弟也不可靠；長江７號：地球人都不可靠。
果真靠山山倒，靠水水跑。唯有自立自強才是正道！哈哈
Posted by tacchang at 02:20 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
December 07, 2007
豈只暗陰羊這麼簡單
基本上事看到我的老友寫了這麼一篇文章，我是覺得不要苛責他們啦。本來想直接comment，但是居然禁止，只好自己動手囉。
最主要看到這一段：
你有你的工作要做，現場是沒有別人嗎？這些鏡頭是可以參加普立茲獎嗎？回家看到這則新聞各個角度都快補滿了，這樣的連線有什麼意義啊？拿去參加噗ㄘ獎啦！！！這種行為還可以被自家媒體拿來大書特書？
老宋，你有所不知，在新聞傳播領域裡面，這個攝影記者沒去救人是真的符合專業的舉動。翻白話就是，老師有講，他也記住了。因為如果她去救人，那哪有記者知道這個新聞呢？？
你可以說這是這個職業本身的局限性，不過悲哀的地方在，這是每個攝影記者總有一天會遇到的掙扎。真的很悲哀。
套一句我的老師說過的一句話結尾，她說，以後她的小孩如果念新聞她一定斷他雙腳，雖然她本身是正統新聞教育出來，也在教新聞。
Posted by tacchang at 07:14 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
September 12, 2007
A Strong and Moderate Taiwan
A Strong and Moderate Taiwan
Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
Defense Industry Conference, Annapolis, Maryland
September 11, 2007
Vice Minister Ko Cheng-heng, Dr. Su Chi, Rupert, other distinguished guests, I am delighted to be able to speak today at this important event. Many thanks to all of you for being here – especially our friends from Taiwan, who have taken time from busy schedules and traveled so far. I would also like to thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, which has established this conference as the premier annual venue for discussing Taiwan's security. As the State Department's representative, I will touch on broad issues in Taiwan security in my remarks this morning, leaving detailed questions of defense strategy and arms procurement to the military experts. My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.
This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan's democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan's leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength – both military and economic – with moderation. When we see policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.
Origins of U.S. Interest
I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan's security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.
The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan's security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.
With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan's security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing's refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.
The Need for Taiwan's Strength and Moderation
As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S. interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.
A Strong Taiwan
A strong Taiwan is, very simply, one that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time. To the extent Beijing knows it cannot subdue Taiwan swiftly -- before the international community would be able to react -- deterrence is reinforced. Taiwan's prosperity and social stability are, of course, additional sources of strength, but the military dimension is indispensable. A Taiwan that can defend itself is a major factor for peace. A strong Taiwan can also negotiate with Beijing with greater confidence and thereby pursue more effectively durable, equitable arrangements for cross-Strait peace.
After a frankly disappointing performance for several years, there recently has been good news in this area. In budgetary terms alone, Taipei has done much to provide for its defense. For some time the Taiwan defense budget declined as a percentage of GDP. Even during that period, however, it remained substantial – higher than in all but a few other Asian peers. As a portion of a large economy, those budgets provided a basis for some progress. This year, the defense budget has at last begun to increase as a portion of GDP. We congratulate Taiwan's leaders from all major parties for finding a way to break this logjam.
Funding is only part of the defense equation, of course. Taiwan also is pursuing smarter priorities and defensive strategies. It is allocating more money to hardening and sustainment, and it is embracing modern warfighting doctrine, taking advantage of Taiwan's greatest practical asset, its geography. Taiwan and its surroundings constitute an intrinsically challenging military environment, and wise defense expenditures and planning can keep it that way.
U.S. arms sales have played an important role in keeping Taiwan strong, and, of course, today's audience has a special interest in the subject. The Bush Administration demonstrated its recognition of the U.S. role when it approved its 2001 arms package. The Administration's commitment to fulfillment of TRA requirements remains beyond question. The principal issue in Taiwan's defense, however, is not whether Taipei buys a particular weapon system or whether that system comes from domestic factories or from abroad. The principal issue is the substance of Taiwan's overall defensive strategy and the maintenance of core capacities to sustain it. And the decision on that strategy, once again, rests with the Taiwan people themselves. Frankly, an abiding U.S. concern is that Taiwan as yet has still not had the sort of sustained, general debate on security that we think it deserves. We hope that, in the coming election season, the people of Taiwan will demand of their political candidates an intelligent and productive discussion of this profoundly important subject.
At the same time, I want to give credit to both Taiwan's ruling party and the opposition for the very real progress that they have made in recent years. Under President Chen's leadership, the MND has begun compiling more sophisticated budgets and sought increases in overall funding. For its part, the opposition-controlled legislature has performed its role by vetting and passing these budgets, giving the executive branch most of what it requested. The United States welcomes these developments as hopeful signs that we are witnessing a maturation of the public debate on Taiwan, one in which political leaders lay aside damaging accusations against one another's basic patriotism and agree to place defense above partisan politics. Whether or not these recent events become a long-term trend will depend on leaders from all political parties, including many in the audience today.
A Moderate Taiwan
I would now like to turn to the other indispensable dimension of Taiwan's security, a moderate, sophisticated, effective political approach toward cross-Strait relations. Without moderation, Taiwan's security will be compromised, no matter how much money Taipei spends on defense and no matter how wisely those defense dollars have been allocated. On the other hand, all things being equal, a moderate approach by Taipei to relations across the Strait will reduce the challenges faced by Taiwan's armed forces.
Taiwan occupies a delicate and, indeed, unique political position. The absence of a resolution of cross-Strait disputes causes understandable frustration among many people, but it's a fact of life that the majority of Taiwan citizens understand. That recognition is reflected in opinion polling that shows powerful, consistent support for the status quo.
In terms of security, the proposition is reasonably simple: as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing's use of force. The United States has repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable, and we have repeatedly called on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to cease its arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan. But as much as we oppose Beijing's threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan's security is inextricably linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that Taipei should or can be passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.
The USG's recent expression of concern about certain policies advocated by the Chen Administration has flowed directly from this perspective. I want to emphasize that the overall U.S.-Taiwan relationship is as close and mutually beneficial as ever. The friendship between the American people and the people of Taiwan has deep roots and continues to flourish. The disagreements that have arisen occur in a comparatively narrow part of the U.S.-Taiwan agenda. Since it is the part that directly relates to peace and stability, however, the disagreement is very important.
In particular, we have expressed special concern about Chen Administration support for a proposed referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan. Much has been said on Taiwan about U.S. positions, a lot of it wrong. Let me try to provide some clarity.
The United States is not opposed to referenda; Taiwan is as entitled to hold referenda as is any other democracy. But the topic and content of any particular referendum must be considered. A referendum on applying to the UN without the suggestion of name change as part of that referendum – while striking us as odd and unproductive - would not elicit a very strong reaction from the United States. Given that everyone knows the bulk of Taiwan's citizens would like to see Taipei apply to the United Nations and given that such a referendum would have no prospect of improving the likelihood of success in such an application, everybody would know that support for such a referendum would only be useful in domestic political posturing in Taiwan. For the United States' part, the matter of how to respond would be straightforward: we would reiterate that we do not support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a referendum.
The particular referendum supported by President Chen concerns us considerably more than would a generic referendum on applying to the UN. What worries us, very specifically, is the issue of name change. This draft referendum raises the question of what Taiwan should be called in the international community. Moreover, it does so in what could be interpreted by many to be a legally-binding popular vote. In an ideal world, we would not have to worry about this. In the vernacular, we all speak of "Taiwan." The State Department does, people in Taiwan do, even Beijing does. So why worry about using the same word in this more formal political and legal context? The simple reality is that, in the world of cross-Strait relations, political symbolism matters, and disagreements over it could be the source of major tensions or even conflict. President Chen recognized the importance of such "symbolic" issues in 2000 and 2004 when he promised our President and the international community not to pursue a change in Taiwan's official name, and he has reaffirmed that promise repeatedly.
It is the apparent pursuit of name change in the referendum, therefore, that makes the initiative appear to us to be a step intended to change the status quo. Arguments that the referendum, even if passed, would not amount to a pursuit of name change, frankly, strike us as purely legalistic. After all, if the specific nomenclature does not matter, why include it in the referendum in the first place? At a fundamental level, such legalistic arguments from supporters of the referendum make it seem that they do not take seriously Taiwan's commitments to the United States and the international community, are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan's most steadfast friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for short-term political gain. Our bottom line is that the potential downsides of such an initiative for Taiwan and U.S. interests are potentially large, and, as with any UN referendum, the benefits for Taiwan's international status are non-existent, so we must oppose such an initiative strongly.
I would like to face head-on the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum constitutes interference in Taiwan's democracy. On behalf of the U.S. Government, I reject this accusation categorically. Given the decades of America's commitment to Taiwan's security and support for its democratization, the idea just does not stand up to scrutiny. The reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. It happens all the time around the world. Moreover, friends have an obligation to warn friends who are moving in an unwise direction. The U.S. obligation is even stronger, given our interest in Taiwan's security. After all, it is not just Taiwan's peace and stability that Taipei's actions may threaten.
The United States has neither the power nor the right to tell the Taiwan people what they can and cannot do. As friends, however, we feel it is our obligation to warn that the content of this particular referendum is ill-conceived and potentially quite harmful. Bad public policy initiatives are made no better for being wrapped in the flag of "democracy." Fortunately, if the referendum goes forward unchanged, we anticipate that Taiwan's perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because it will be fundamentally harmful to Taiwan's external relations.
Beyond the obvious threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait, the United States also opposes the proposed referendum because it will do the exact opposite of what it promises: it will limit, not expand, Taiwan's international space. Arguments to the contrary sound heroic, but they stand in opposition to the evidence all around us. I can say this to you with real experience, because it is the State Department that takes the lead in the U.S. Government in trying to help preserve and expand the Taiwan people's international space. The frustrating truth is that needlessly provocative actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing's hand in limiting Taiwan's space and scare away potential friends who might help Taiwan.
This is again an area where we have to acknowledge a tough truth. Whether we like it or not, most countries in the world accept Beijing's characterization of Taiwan, and, when energized, the PRC can call in overwhelming support to marginalize Taipei. The Taiwan people are, of course, long accustomed to PRC pressure, and we are certainly not telling them not to resist these efforts; our own position is far from passive. That said, Taipei needs to push back intelligently and in a sophisticated manner that plays to its strengths. Frontal assaults on Beijing's sensitivities are bound to fail and, at the end of the day, leave Taipei further behind. The referendum on applying to the UN under the name Taiwan is just such a frontal assault with no hope of changing Taiwan's actual status on the international stage while increasing cross-Strait tensions and alienating potential supporters of Taiwan's increased international space.
I would like to emphasize that we do not like having to express publicly our disagreement with the Chen Administration on this or any other policy. Taiwan is a longstanding U.S. friend, and we do not like there to be gaps between us on important issues. I can assure you that we would not have done so had we not exhausted every private opportunity through consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative messages over an extended period of time. The problem here is not misunderstanding or lack of communications: it is that we believe this initiative is not good for Taiwan or us and that we have found ourselves with no alternative but to express our views directly to the Taiwan people.
A Confident Taiwan
While I am using this podium to convey tough truths, let me raise a more positive point that is not often mentioned but deserves to be: let me debunk the myth that the people of Taiwan are isolated or that Taiwan is an international orphan. Yes, Taipei has formal diplomatic relationships with only a small number of states, and it is not a member of the United Nations. The reality, however, is that Taiwan could not be the first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse it is if it were not extensively integrated into global society. Its citizens could not travel the world on business and pleasure, its airliners and freighters could not span the globe, and it could not be one of the world's premier sources of information technology. Taipei may not have many embassies, but it has dozens of unofficial offices around the planet staffed with professional representatives who carry on the business of the people of Taiwan. In the trade arena alone, Taipei would be an economic backwater if it were not thoroughly linked into the dense web of global institutions that support international commerce. Many of Taipei's most important relationships are unofficial, and yet genuine communication and cooperation goes on every day of the year.
To confirm this, just follow the news to see the steady stream of senior Taiwan officials who visit Washington and other parts of the United States. People often focus on the absence of visits at the highest levels, but those are infrequent in any relationship. For anybody who bothers to pay attention, it quickly becomes clear that the U.S.-Taiwan dialogue is comparable in substance and scope to that with any other medium-size partner.
I am not trying to downplay the genuine limitations on the international space of the Taiwan people, and I appreciate the frustrations that these must generate. At the end of the day, Taiwan occupies an unusual place in the global community. For Taiwan’s elected leadership, the challenge ahead is how to maximize the people's interest within this context. Fortunately, Taiwan has done remarkably well, and, when Taipei plays its hand well, it has a range of positive opportunities in the years ahead.
Strategic U.S. Interests
The United States has a consistent policy toward the Taiwan Strait. Year in and year out, and over administrations from both major parties, that policy has provided great benefits not only for the American people but also for the people of Taiwan. If there is any doubt about this, just consider Taiwan's circumstances at the time of de-recognition nearly 30 years ago now. Its vibrant democracy and prosperous, first world society today offer a vastly better life to the people of Taiwan. And as a friend of Taiwan, as an indispensable supporter of its democracy and freedoms, the United States ranks second to none. Americans can feel justifiably proud for having done the right thing, again and again.
While our support for Taiwan is beyond question, nobody here will be surprised if I say that the United States defines its own interests and interprets East Asian regional developments for it. There is, therefore, absolutely no foundation to the assertion that the United States coordinates its Taiwan policy with Beijing. It just does not happen. Words like coordination and cooperation simply do not apply to the relationship between Washington and Beijing on Taiwan policy. Do Chinese views influence U.S. thinking? Of course: we would be reckless, as would Taipei, if we did not take them into consideration. But I can assure you that no USG official at any level spends any amount of time coordinating our policies toward Taiwan with Beijing. Rumors of such coordination abound, but as with many rumors, they have no basis in fact.
By the same token, while we have a close, friendly relationship with Taipei, we also do not let Taipei define our positions. For well-established reasons, the United States has declared its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait. Some Taiwan leaders in recent years have asserted that Taiwan independence is the status quo that should be defended. On that point, let me be perfectly clear: while U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.
Conclusion
Let me bring this presentation to a close by returning to the fundamental issue that has brought all of us together here. Regardless of whether members of this audience are officials in President Chen's Administration, opposition party leaders, U.S. corporate executives, journalists, scholars, or U.S. Government officials, we all share an abiding interest in the security of Taiwan, an important friend of the United States occupying a delicate position in a sensitive neighborhood. The United States Government believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and we will remain the steadfast partner of the people of Taiwan as they seek to advance their interests in the years ahead.
Released on September 11, 2007
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June 23, 2007
腳尾米
今天下午在民視看到一個節目在探討這個問題，不知道腳尾米的可以先看一下再研究。下面我有投書，不過對方連基本的自動回覆都沒有，看來石沉大海了。
今天這幾位學生質疑的地方是「這種東西也叫新聞」這樣的題目。大家花了精力報導與收看卻是一些新聞價值不知為何的東西，這是為了什麼？為甚麼大家要把精神放在這樣的價值之上？學生的手法當然就是必須製造能夠吻合這樣的價值的新聞題材，讓編輯台上面的人可以進入這樣的實驗。
另外，主持人把目前新聞風氣的一部分歸咎於香港新聞入侵台灣之後的變化。但是，捫心自問，很多媒體不是在星期三星期四的時候一直引用某週刊或某日報報導，之後長時間不斷炒作？
主持人一直想要把問題轉成造假新聞，可是，這個問題根本跟學生的訴求不同。學生的訴求是，他們製造了根本不夠格的新聞但是記者卻認為是新聞。還有，如果主持人只想講法律責任，忽略了新聞倫理與媒體道德這個作為新聞人的基本信念，那任何問題就只能等待法院裁判了。
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June 21, 2007
倒敘之三---誠品聽演講之王文華篇
王文華真的是很有趣，長得就是一副念文學的樣子，不過我不知道為甚麼他那麼喜歡問我問題....orz
他主要是講幾個創意發想的方法，這些抱歉，不是我老張賣瓜，以前陳文玲教我們大一廣告概論的時候講得比他多n倍。所以真的以前的教育很厚重（？）雖然都多少年過去了，我還是認為王講得沒有陳好。
我覺得他是很會掌握訊息與時事的人，現代感十足，走在時代潮流尖端。不知道他的時間管理如何。不過，我還是要挑一下骨頭，你能不能不要穿T shirt就上台啊？還是一件爛爛的t shirt，還有，你的師奶迷們可不可以不要那麼瘋。說實話，一個戀愛都一直失敗的敗犬怎麼有資格在那邊指導人家「下棋」？怎麼會有人迷成這樣？不很了解。
啊，大概是「我們一國」的力量吧。
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倒敘之二---誠品聽演講之黃舒駿篇
這是台灣大哥大跟中國時報開卷版還有誠品的共同企劃。如何利用簡訊發展成為文學的最後一講。
黃還是不改他的才子氣息，一身黑，用了大量的比喻，認為唐朝的李白跟他是做一樣的事情，不同的地方在，我們共同把音樂市場搞掉了。
聽完之後覺得音樂市場真的很不景氣，雖然我也聽mp3，但是我最多的東西都是從自己的CD轉過來以及買了emusic帳號下載的。別人給的mp3反而很少聽了。我要說的是，也許李白是創作，寫歌也是創作，但是影響力不應該等同於金錢。李白寫詩也沒賺錢啊。這樣寫歌賺錢然後跟唐詩宋詞的類比我認為本質上還有不同的地方。不過爬格子的真的需要大家愛護，看到最好的五月天也只不過賣個十幾萬張CD就叫大賣的確是跟阿妹一張百萬差很多。
不過黃提到一個很有趣的現象，以前去KTV大家點的歌大家都會唱，現在你點你的我點我的，你知道不等於我會唱。各顧各的。這樣剛好碰上不景氣的緣故所以KTV生意變很差很差。唉。
我還是認為，唱歌要賺錢是可以，不過要賺大錢，哼哼，好像別鬧了。
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June 05, 2007
超級星光大道
這是最近想講的東西的第三篇，但是卻是正常出版的第一篇。我先倒敘好了。
回到台灣終於可以擺脫Youtube的小畫面，直接收看大電視的衝擊。其中我最想看的東西除了HBO之外就是那個赫赫有名的超級星光大道。不過奇怪的是大概陰錯陽差好幾次，回來一段時間卻都沒有收看。直到上星期五在老婆的敦促之下終於來了我們的第一次。
結果
好看嗎？還不錯看，尤其這一集是unplugged，簡單的環境只能用原汁原味來較勁。七個參賽者都奮不顧身的拿出看家本領（好像也有人當作極限運動在挑戰），雖然最後要踢掉一個，不過大家都蠻厲害的。
我必須坦承，我看這個節目的感覺跟在民歌西餐廳聽歌是一樣的。也就是說，他們都很會唱，如此而已，像什麼黃韻玲林志炫這些人的講評，我聽得懂，但是不會管這麼多。充其量，這個節目只是有畫面的廣播節目。好聽，但是我不會很想管誰最後出線。誰出線都一樣，我會買的機會不大，要看現場狀況為主。
會不會再看第二次，恩，如果那時間沒有好看的日劇或者是電影，手邊又沒有dvd，應該會吧，反正是個拿來當成背景音樂很不錯的電視節目。
推不推薦？不會主動推薦，頂多跟著別人附和一下。
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April 23, 2007
N綱N本
最近又在吵這個綱本的問題，其實政治勢力干涉國家教育是一種「不得不的天經地義」。所以一旦政治勢力有了消長，倒楣的就是根本手無寸鐵的老百姓。
台灣的問題更複雜在於政治勢力糾纏上了我們一致習慣的考試制度，崇尚絕對答案的意識形態作祟。這樣的結合不是今天誰上台誰下台就可以完美解決。需要時間先「解放」了考試制度，再回頭去切割政治如何放開教育。不過我要說後者真的很難！
看到台灣立報的一篇報導，我覺得這位歷史老師非常勇敢，我比較可惜的地方是怎麼不是我母校的老師寫咧，真是。
哪一本該聽誰的？教科書與歷史詮釋權的解放
單兆榮（北一女中歷史老師）
本文轉載自《人本教育札記》213期
學者在上游製造各學科知識的研究成果，老師在中游以各種教學方法將過程展現，學生在下游學習他能夠帶得走的能力。在這條大河裡，最重要的內涵是方法與過程。於是，任何一個學科的研究成果，都只能在一本教科書裡呈現精簡的少部分，任何一個層級的教學，也都只選擇某些例子作為學習的切入點。
所以，老師心中沒有教科書，學生手中也只是一個文本，教學的主導權一旦回到老師與學生手中，每一本教科書由於教的人不同，學的人不同，有了不一樣的解讀方式。進入後現代，我們怎能還停留在現代的思維呢？
所謂‘最好最完整’的教科書
真有一本「最好、最完整」的教科書嗎？如果有，那麼世界上所有的書都該束諸高閣了。
每一本書，限於篇幅，礙於作者的主觀愛好，總有優點，也有缺失，老師就是修補者，視學生程度隨時調整。多本教科書的選擇是辛苦的，但這正是自由的可貴代價，每一校的老師，根據該校學生特質選擇適合的教材，各校一起決定一本，因為有個最大的盲點是：我們並不瞭解其他學校的學生。
教育賦予老師的重責大任，這樣的選擇權若重新落入行政官僚體系中，會有什麼後果？當一版獨大時，何必改進？當沒有市場競爭時，批評的聲音被聽到的機會多大？如果企業民營化是趨勢，何以教科書一定要回到國營呢？
例如台灣地位是開羅會議決定？還是舊金山和約認可？這樣的解釋權，在戒嚴時期部編本的時代，只能有開羅會議一解。解嚴後，人人有解釋權，不只歷史學者，而是所有學者；不只媒體記者有詮釋權，社會大眾也有，真是百家爭鳴，恰是民主精神。
藍營認為，開羅宣言是四強地位的事實認定，與會者是蔣中正與宋美齡，宣稱台灣將來歸屬中華民國。綠營看開羅宣言，則強調「宣言」無法律效力，不敵舊金山和約。
於是，綠營看舊金山和約，強調日本只是結束佔領台灣，並未說明台灣歸屬何國？藍營則說，簽訂舊金山和約的是中華民國政府，根據此約簽訂中日和約的是中華民國。
學生不只生活在校園裡，也活在社會上，不會聽不見各種聲音。於是各版教科書，盡量將兩種說法並列，老師正好以此作為歷史教學的素材，呈現多元看法，討論各種解釋，營造一個可以溝通的社會。這就是歷史的真相，真相是複雜的。
英國教科書如何寫愛爾蘭？
英格蘭政府如何書寫愛爾蘭的歷史？當然是交給學術專業，交給自由市場。以S.H.P系列的教科書為例（只是許多版本中之一），以一名女性愛爾蘭共和軍切入，提供愛爾蘭報紙對她的敘述，也提供英格蘭政府官方的看法，還放上醜化此女子的漫畫與真實照片對比。
學生像偵探一樣，由題目的設計，在老師的引導下，一一解讀每一篇文章作者的企圖，學習看清人們的主觀認知，提醒每一個人同情的理解別人的主觀，因為自己也常身陷其中。
我們會比德國人更容易看清希特勒的本質，但看漢人對待原住民的方式也能超然嗎？愛爾蘭問題在學校這樣的點滴指引下，每一代會逐漸減輕敵視，仇恨才有機會化解。我們今天的藍綠對決、仇恨共黨，正是一言堂教科書下的產物，怎能再重蹈覆轍呢？
英國怎麼考？台灣現在怎麼考？
英國老師在教室裡自由選擇某一議題的專題書籍深入探討，如選一本厚達幾百頁的書—《威瑪共和國與納粹帝國》，其中有許多史料佐證，設計許多問題討論，呈現多種解釋與表格圖片等。孩子們學的不同，但都學到了史料閱讀的方法、證據的選擇與文本的討論。
因此，英國入學測驗不會考記得什麼？考的是應用式的判斷與書寫。學生可以選考其中一種他熟悉的議題，如對美國史有興趣的選美國史考題，喜歡中古時代者選中古，史學方法一致，於是課堂教的是帶得走的能力，考試也配合，就考這樣的能力，這才是總結性評量的目標，不是嗎？
台灣基於對「公平」的強烈癖好，不能出問答題，理由是不公平或考生太多改不完。但經過精心設計，也能考出概念題，不管讀哪一版本都會，或是沒有一個版本寫過，必須融會貫通才會寫這樣的應用題。以大考中心95年歷史學測19題為例：
以下是清朝以後中國人稱呼西方人的幾個說法：
甲、「中國稱『鬼子』其實是龜茲的轉音，只有通稱西方之意。」
乙、「以後各式公文，凡有關大英國臣民者，不得書『夷』字。」
丙、「茶葉大黃，外國所必需，中國不售，『夷人』何以為生？」
它們出現的先後次序應是：（A）甲、乙、丙 （B）乙、丙、甲 （C）乙、甲、丙 （D）丙、乙、甲（答：D）
此題的判斷準則是語氣與觀念的改變。丙以為外國人需要茶葉大黃去油解膩，一定不能不吃，這是早期對外人的誤解。乙則因為應英國人要求去除夷字，顯然是南京條約簽訂後的不得已。甲則是今天企圖解釋何以使用鬼子的稱呼，以避免大漢沙文主義之嫌，是多元社會出現的壓力。學生只要對觀念的演變理解，就可輕鬆判斷。還能培養學生對不同時代不同人物的理解，寄予同情的認知，不厚誣古人，能寬待異己，正是歷史學最重要的價值。
再舉大考一例：「春秋五霸到戰國七雄，國家數目越來越多？還是越來越少？國君權力越來越大？還是越來越小？答案是：國家數目越來越少，國君權力越來越大」
當年這題答對的高中學生不多，原因是老師與學生們都執著於背誦哪五霸？哪七雄？卻忘了春秋到戰國最具意義的變化是：大國兼併小國，各國國君追求富強，以中央集權取代封建。這種概念題，提醒我們時代趨勢與變遷才是學習的重點。
讀多本，學問多？
一個教育部綱要，已經限定了各版本知識的範疇，只是寫法切入點不同而已。如果讀完各版，廣泛閱讀相似的內容，不過精熟了一丁點可憐的知識，所以讀多本，只是自我安慰而已。既然閱讀多本教科書，學問不會增加，為什麼還要堅持多本呢？以教學現場來看，「萬般皆下品，唯有讀書高」依然宰制我們社會的價值判斷。
只讀一本，老師們會陷入至少此本應該背熟的迷思，出題容易偏向知識記憶；學生家長更理所當然要求孩子讀課本或參考書就好，其他不要花時間，因為考試不考；老師要求讀其他經典書籍，學生更有理由拒絕，因為考試到了，時間不夠了，這點一般所謂「用功」的孩子最嚴重，因為他們太在意成績了。
昔日一綱一本的問題，多本出現後，正在努力解決，教育問題需要長時間經營的。
我們照顧了弱勢嗎？
贊成一本者，打著照顧弱勢（設定為無法買更多參考書者）的正義呼聲，乍聽有理。但問題的癥結卻是，如果「老師仍然不用有趣的方法」，「家長依然不用瞭解的眼光」，則不喜歡讀書的學生仍然無法體會閱讀的快樂，孩子的其他才能一樣被忽略，這些才是我們真正需要關心的議題。
少子化的趨勢下，每位家長都只有一、二個寶貝，因為「大家都站著」，於是「沒人肯坐下」，不想輸給別人，怕孩子失去信心，或昔日背書的痛苦經驗猶在，都讓家長們不放心。殊不知，這些擔憂靠寫參考書、測驗卷或上補習班，反而失去應對現在考題的能力。
再舉一考題說明：十九世紀的王公貴族、資本家、勞工、共產黨、同性戀都會對以下哪一議題有共同認知？答案是：民族主義。沒有哪一本教科書會如此書寫民族主義的議題，但考的是學生應用的能力，只需判斷這些人的交集即可。
許多參考書或測驗卷，為了增加篇幅，提升價錢，每一小節出3、40題，出題必然瑣碎，好題不易多；如下述考題：「人是政治的動物，這句話是誰說的？答案：亞里斯多德」，相信以追求真理和證據的聞名的亞里斯多德也必痛哭於九泉吧！
反之，大考則在3年的知識範疇裡，只出3、40題，放大格局，概念與應用層次高的題目多。所以啃參考書想考好學校，無異緣木求魚、刻舟求劍。怎麼會有買不起多本參考書的問題呢？更何況，參考書的價錢比課本貴多了，家長何需花冤枉錢！
不如閱讀經典好書
閱讀經典好書，才是學習解決問題能力的正途。英國給孩子們讀的40本數學圖畫書（漢聲出版）如《0不等於沒有》一書探討0的用途：當它放在數字中間如304的十位數雖然是空的，但需要它來佔個位置；放在數字後面如340，多了10倍，而且人們希望後面的0越多越好。又如《配對的偶數》一書以籃球隊5人一組，需要與另一隊的5人一個個配成對，來說明偶數的意義。數學的精神在這樣的書裡充分被呈現。
提供我自己帶小孩的經驗。天衛文化的小魯歷史叢書，讓孩子們與鄭板橋等古做一趟《超時空之旅》，或是描寫美洲印地安人在7年戰爭時困境的《最後一個摩希根人》，或《故事版資治通鑑》套書，書眉上的「老編曰」，彷彿「太史公曰」、「臣光曰」的再現。歷史小說讀完後，還會加上有趣的旅遊設計，處處可見用心。
自然科學的書籍，孩子看法布爾昆蟲記系列的《糞金龜》笑聲不斷，常興奮地與我分享，這絕不是看百科全書能得到的樂趣。成人後，閱讀至今仍是他睡前重要的糧食，學習不是件可怕的事，學習不是在遠離考試後就結束了。
老師如何指導學生閱讀？教科書是最初的文本，對程度較不足的孩子，請他在課堂上閱讀，練習找出哪一句是他覺得最重要的？程度中等的孩子，則請他換句話說；程度更高的孩子，當然是提供更多經典書籍，這就是因材施教。許多教育理論，不該只當口號用，而是拿來實踐的。
是人使制度變質
改革制度一直是我們面對問題最直接的思考，就像清末面對西潮一般，船堅砲利的君主專制不足以應對，就改成虛君立憲政體，結果連民主共和都出現了，人們還是不了解民主為何物？於是中國人不適合民主的論調讓民初數度出現帝制復活。
類似的論調如今在21世紀重現，一綱多本在執行上出現了偏差，於是下一個簡單結論：國情不同的我們，不適合一綱多本，因為那是外國土壤下開的花。
建構式數學就是最好的例子，少數老師因為誤解而執行過當，學習面積時，剪5個方格已經達到練習目的，卻要求學生剪5百個方塊，家長當然痛惜孩子為了作業弄到半夜的辛苦，於是建構式數學成了學生數學程度低落的禍首，其實建構式的精神，是重解題的過程，而不是得出結果。老師應常自問：我能讓學生得到什麼？
改人心比改制度花時間
關心教育是每個人的責任，決策的確可以付諸公共辯論，坐下來對話，了解彼此堅持的部分是否有協調的可能？但不能靠投票。投票或問卷只能統計出「數量」，不能呈現「質量」。改人心，比改制度更花時間，我們需要仔細思量與琢磨的時間，方能成就教育百年大業。
Posted by tacchang at 04:56 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 15, 2007
升等？
最近看到一篇由（也算是母校的）交大前研發長林一平教授對資訊學院新進助理教授的一封公開信。恩，難怪交大的教授casualty比其他學校是高了很多。
記得1996年春假一位很厲害的多媒體教授因為肝病過逝，不到40歲，正值壯年！因為當時跟一個很奇怪的園區多媒體（硬體）的公司有個合作而間接認識了這位老師，糟糕的是，現在我都想不起來名字（後記，是黃書淵教授）
。他就是「世界是平的」代表。每天晚上三點離開實驗室，早上七點八點就在實驗室裡面。超拼！
可是聽我的ex論文指導教授轉述，當這位老師在林口長庚的病床跟來訪的同事對話時，講了一句，孩子還小，老婆又待在家。如果可以，我不要這樣。前兩年交大又一下損失三位優秀教授。
我不是來踢館的，我自己知道我是什麼身份什麼地位，能講什麼。只是好奇林教授口中那位「林風」是何許人。G了一下，乖乖龍滴咚。小我四歲的副教授，已經有26篇已發表期刊。好驚人！記得一個月前b6s才跟我提到東京大學有個帥氣教授，好像也是小我一歲。天啊～～～～～
我必須承認我不是很優秀！這種學術路線還是留給這些怪才好了。我只要好好的把open source教學環境搞定，HCI好好研究，這種神童級升等就留給其他有志之士趕快拼吧。b6s不要混了，就快做吧。
Posted by tacchang at 03:46 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
April 13, 2007
新說文解字
樹多必有枯枝..人多必有白痴..
樹不要皮必死無疑..人不要臉天下無敵
多學著點喔～～～
Posted by tacchang at 09:06 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
March 14, 2007
好科技的條件
因為分了一點時間到我蠻關心的事情上面，跟宿主研究了一下到底樂生療養院的位置，想到我最常用的兩個工具Google Map與Yam Map。
我的習慣是用穀歌看美國與用蕃薯藤看台灣，兩者再這兩個區域都有極為驚人的優異表現，不過穀歌畢竟口袋深很多，能夠提供的玩法也比較厲害，不過蕃薯藤也可以了。
看完樂生院的位置之後，宿主說要找他家，南投草屯，喔，看了一下，也蠻容易的找到，不過定位上面因為宿主說鄉下人沒有記路名的習慣（難道這也是老婆不會記路的原因嗎？）花了多一點時間確定，也還好有標定物可以提共辨認，恩，中原國小，好怪異的校園配置，像個棒球場一樣的校舍分佈。
最後找了一下三重與內湖的家，不知道怎麼，心情突然變得很差，一方面是看到內湖的家附近越來越多的房子感到惋惜，一個幽靜的小地方變成一個人來人往的鬧區，就咳ㄟ。更多的感覺是我人在美國沒辦法陪伴家人，更是咳。
所以，好科技的條件就是隨手可得，讓人覺得"Hi"，如果可以讓使用者覺得眼睛濕濕的更是高妙啦。
Posted by tacchang at 01:44 PM | Comments (0)
February 16, 2007
不乾脆
最近開始比較常去意欲蔓延跟mobile01這兩個洋溢著無限敗家氣氛的歡樂網站。
不知道從什麼時候開始，大家講東西的時候都喜歡加上一個X。比如說X和汽車，博X公司。要不然更奇怪的，就是會加一句話：再那個年代敢做某件事情的某公司，名字我就不講了。
很鳥耶。這種說話方式直逼我看到一定轉台的政論節目來賓
政治評論家張友驊，4日晚間在趙少康戶外開講的節目時再度驚爆內幕，他表示，其實高捷弊案的關鍵照片不只一張，而是有12張，其中4張已經外流，包括扁政府高層都看過照片，張友驊還說，下禮拜就會公佈另一張照片
或者前一陣子很紅的邱毅。
真搞笑，我跟學生講媒體暴力與閱聽人行為的時候還一再強調這兩件事情到目前來看沒有一個很完整的科學證據證明有關。可是，我發現，媒體暴力這件事情也許是無關，但是cultivation卻十足展現啊。也許暴力不能算是一個研究的自變項。所以我真的相信媒體有幾大理論，像是涵化，導入，使用滿足，德國西瓜理論這之類的。
好吧，我可以考慮再回去傳播研究看看。
還是不要，我喜歡做教育。
Posted by tacchang at 02:21 PM | Comments (0)
February 09, 2007
MR. MCCORMACK
Well, first of all, it's not that it didn't have any comment on it. I said that I wanted to understand the facts better and that we would offer some comment, based on the -- our assessment of the facts as you've described them. But the primary interest of the United States remains the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral steps by either side that would change the status quo. As we have said many times before, we do not support administrative steps by Taiwan authorities that would appear to change Taiwan's status unilaterally or move towards independence. The United States does not, for instance, support changes in terminology for entities administered by Taiwan authorities. President Chen's fulfillment of his commitments will be a test of leadership, dependability and statesmanship, as well the ability to protect Taiwan's interests, its relations with others and to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
都是講這樣的啊，不過當自己都不能宣張自己的利益的時候，那算什麼？
Posted by tacchang at 10:31 PM | Comments (0)
February 06, 2007
好嚇人的歌詞啊，怎麼這麼真實
你就好像煙火一樣爆炸我的心情 閉上眼睛高潮就過去
你就好像國王一樣穿上你的新衣 忘了身邊皇后的美麗
我要的只是多一點浪漫而已 我要的只是我不用再三提醒
我當然會希望 我是QUEEN
你會假裝朋友一樣重視我的心情 逃避我們之間的愛情
你和別的男人一樣 自私虛偽善變無情可是
我卻好像不想離開你 你是個好地方讓我發洩情緒
每一個小地方都要徹徹底底 在你的小地方 我是QUEEN
不想再為你 再為你 悶死我自己 就算我如此愛你
不想再為你 再為你 委屈我自己 我想你早已經不愛我
你只在乎你的小人國 到最後你最愛的還是你自己
你是個好地方讓我發洩情緒 每一個小地方都要徹徹底底
在你的小地方 我是QUEEN
不想再為你 再為你 悶死我自己 就算我如此愛你
不想再為你 再為你 委屈我自己 我想你早已經不愛我
你只在乎你的小人國 到最後你最愛的還是你自己
你不愛我
你就好像國王一樣穿上你的新衣 忘了身邊皇后的美麗
我要的只是多一點浪漫而已 我要的只是我不用再三提醒
你當你的國王 我是QUEEN
Posted by tacchang at 09:45 PM | Comments (0)
May 16, 2006
歷史回憶不容抹滅
其實我對政治人物反覆的性格沒有什麼意見，因為那是他們的特性。只不過如果我們會因此幻想或著依賴這樣的人給我們帶來好生活，這也未免太單純了一點。事實上，歷史證明我們看到千千萬萬幻想者一個大無敵的強人可以帶領我們過好日子，結果卻因為各式各樣的原因幻滅。
我的這種絕望其來有自，大概是血統的關係，我父親與母親基本上恰恰好反映了這樣的殘酷事實。父親以為押對寶，可以跟著國民黨過好日子，誰曉得越混格局越小，還因為不爽上級所以下場很慘。我母親，應該說我的外公，一個廣東客家商人，為了在那混亂的時代討生活，也是想發財，居然跑來台灣，靠著仲介兩地的商品過日子。只是來了就再回不去了。
剛好碰到文革四十週年，基本上我對於文革的認識也是來自於報章，不過我看到那一代的中國人，只覺得似曾相似，原來又是千千萬萬個我爸我外公的翻版。
也許人的眼界不要太高，雄心壯志小一點，反而造成的紛爭還少一些。
這只是我的猜測。
Posted by tacchang at 09:06 PM | Comments (0)
May 15, 2006
網路功能之一，歷史的記憶
請問「為什麼要向你道歉」？
----致李登輝先生
李先生︰
在二二八這一天，願你能心安！
沒有人能否認，二二八是台灣歷史上的慘劇。事發時，數萬無辜英靈慘死刀槍下。事發後，千萬善良百姓活在恐怖屠殺的陰影中。這都是目前你所領導的統治 集團所犯的滔天罪惡。
現在，你領導這個曾經犯下人神共憤罪行的統治集團已經八年了，在這麼長的時間裡，你除了被民意所逼，做了言不由衷、咬文嚼字、毫無真誠的道歉；利用台灣人民的稅金建了有碑無文的紀念碑；施捨受難家屬一點補償金以外幾時你曾心 懷愧疚？不但如此，你和這個昧盡天良的統治集團，竟掩藏真切史料，使得二二八真相難明、後代子孫無從記取歷史教訓；庇護原兇，使滿手血腥的罪犯，躲開公理的評斷、法律的制裁；最近，又用如同施捨救濟的補償，再度重創受害家屬的心靈、侮辱他們的人格。
為了展現愛的真諦追求一個充滿喜樂的台灣這些罪惡，我們曾竭力勸請同胞大量寬宥。可是今天，正當我們和許許多多的台灣人正悲傷地為二二八哀悼，為死難家屬追思的時刻，卻意外得知你也是二二八事件的受人，是「欠人道歉的人」， 這使我們非常的心疼。
二二八的受害人和家屬，在台灣是最應該被疼惜的一群苦命人。我們（林義雄和 方素敏，十六年前的二月二十八日，一個在坐牢、一個去探監，我們在台北市信義路的家，當時正受著特務全日二十四小時嚴密監控。可是當日下午，我們六十 歲與世無爭的慈祥母親、只有七歲天真無邪的雙胞愛女，郤都被殺慘死在家中地 下室裡）不敢說自己是二二八事件的受害者，可是卻不忍心看到台灣存有因為二
二八受害而心有創傷的人，所以親自來到你的門前，請你出來，在光天化日下， 說說看你到底在二二八受了什麼害？讓全知的上帝來評判：「應不應該要向你道歉」？
如果你還有一丁點的天良，那麼請你出來！請你出來！如果上帝說：你應受道歉。那麼我們會很虔誠地向你這位「欠人道歉的人」道歉。
願
上帝保佑你
林義雄方素敏
於慈母及愛女受難十六週年紀念日
Posted by tacchang at 08:12 PM | Comments (0)
April 15, 2006
[無聊]民生報的社論有夠離譜--墾丁的音樂、毒品和商機
很久沒看社論了，因為大多數的社論就是在兩個顏色光譜之間游動，反正就是一邊罵另一邊，沒好話的。不過看到民生報這一天的社論，終於激起我的悸動。
為什麼一場十萬人的聚會被抓到十幾件吸毒，就是全部人都在搞這件事情？
這是哪一國的刻板印象？講一個數據，現在我在德州奧斯丁唸書，每年三月中旬就會有從全世界各地來這邊參加的大拜拜，SXSW。這個大拜拜有三個子活動，音樂，電影，互動科技。今年大概也湧進十萬人參加這個聚會。有講人在吸毒嗎？應該有人吸大麻，不過電視新聞描述的重點都不是這個，轉而描述因為這項活動帶來多少人潮，哪些名人來到奧斯丁，多了哪些工作機會，旅館業可以賺多少錢，pub裡面可以增加多少收入，政府可以獲得多少稅收，更重要的，奧斯丁又可以被世人知道多少。
這是一個地方性活動？如果是20年前可能是一群人為了打發春假無聊而搞出的名堂，可是，現在講到這個活動，多少人會希望在這邊發熱發光，有多少人會在這邊好好的享受音樂電影？太多了！
也因為這樣的大拜拜，奧斯丁有著比其他德州城市更不一樣的特質，更不像德州，反像是東西兩岸的大城市。這特質就是，除了德州好客老土之外，還多了很多包容，很多融合，很多新的可能。
這是一個文化產業發展的最佳例證，不過走到今天這一步也花了不少時間，不過管他的，文化是要慢慢累積，不要強求一步登天。
我也滿懷著春吶可以做到這一步的希望，我也期待這樣的方向可以出現，但是，可以不可以不要先把吸毒販毒跟這個掛勾？我只希望有一個好的文化產業可以因此出現啊。
Posted by tacchang at 10:31 AM | Comments (0)